Botnet in the browser: Understanding threats caused by malicious browser extensions by Perrotta R & Hao F
1Botnet in the Browser: Understanding Threats
Caused by Malicious Browser Extensions
Raffaello Perrotta, and Feng Hao
Abstract—Browser extensions have been established as a common feature present in modern browsers. However, some extension
systems risk exposing APIs which are too permissive and cohesive with the browser’s internal structure, thus leaving a hole for
malicious developers to exploit security critical functionality within the browser itself. In this paper, we raise the awareness of the
threats caused by browser extensions by presenting a botnet framework based on malicious extensions installed in the user’s browser,
and an exhaustive range of attacks that can be launched in this framework. We systematically categorize, describe and implement
these attacks against Chrome, Firefox and Firefox-for-Android, and verify experiments on Windows, Linux and Android systems. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper presents to date the most comprehensive analysis about the threats of botnet in modern browsers
due to the over-privileged capabilities possessed by browser extensions. We also discuss countermeasures to the identified problems.
Index Terms—Web Browser, Scripting Languages.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A TTACKS launched from within the browser have in-creased dramatically in recent years [1]. Though
browsers have taken steps to restrict the installation of
extensions to trusted sources, instances of malware being
packaged into seemingly innocuous extensions are still
regularly being reported. For example, a study conducted
in 2014 by Kapravelos et al. discovered 130 compromised
Chrome extensions [2]. In 2016, MalwareBytes identified
a rogue extension [3] uploaded to Chrome’s web store
known as iCalc, which had bypassed Google’s automated
extension review audit and silently transmitted sensitive
data to a rogue server. A recent study by researchers in
Google highlights extensive efforts by criminals to distribute
malicious extensions through the Chrome Web Store: nearly
10% of the Chrome extensions were identified as malicious
between 2012 – 2015 [1].
Browser extensions are an attractive target for botnets,
which are responsible for many large scale attacks on the
Internet infrastructure today [4]. First, they have poten-
tially a large installation base with hundreds of millions
of users, especially when an adversary opts to distribute
malicious extensions by first buying an existing popular
extension and then adding malicious code in the update
as reported in [1]. Second, a browser extension possesses
many over-privileged capabilities in accessing sensitive user
data. Such capabilities can be easily abused as we will
explain in this paper. Finally, it is relatively easy to trick
a user into installing an innocuous-looking extension that
performs subtle malicious activities in the background [5].
Once installed, an extension forms an integral part of the
browser and is outside the control of anti-virus software
that is installed on the user’s computer.
One early study about botnets in the browser was due
to Liu et al. in 2011 [4]. The authors proposed a botnet
framework based on browser extensions. Their system re-
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lied on exploiting the extension update mechanism, which
browsers provide, to issue commands in batch. The com-
mands would then be processed by the installed extensions
according to their designed format. Within their implemen-
tation, they include three attack examples: email spamming,
DDoS and password sniffing. Their architecture relies on the
extension checking for updates using the extension’s own
update mechanism, which is only polled during events such
as browser startup. This means an attacker cannot target
commands to specific users in the network. Although there
are follow-up papers by Liu et al. in 2012 [6] and other
researchers [7], [8], they are all limited in covering only a
subset of botnet attacks.
In this paper, we aim to systematize the knowledge in
this domain to raise the awareness of the threats present in
modern browsers caused by malicious browser extensions.
To this end, we present an extension-based botnet frame-
work which allows fine-grained controls via a phone-home
based model, and an exhaustive range of attacks that can be
launched by malicious browser extensions. The attacks are
systematically categorized, described and implemented on
Chrome, Firefox and Firefox for Android, which correspond
to 59.24%, 13.29% and 0.68% of the browser market share
[9], respectively. All the attacks have been experimentally
validated against Chrome 54 and Firefox 49 (on both desk-
top and mobile)–which were the versions most recently
available during the study–and on Windows, Linux and
Android systems. To the best of our knowledge, the results
we present are the most comprehensive in the literature
about the threats of botnet in modern browsers imposed
by malicious browser extensions. Finally, countermeasures
to the identified problems are also discussed in this paper.
2 BACKGROUND
Modern browser extension systems are based around the
JSE (JavaScript Engine) model [10], in which the browser
extension is a small set of scripts, generally JavaScript,
2running as part of the browser process. Extensions have
evolved over time to reflect the needs of their user base
which has subsequently led to more privileged extension
models being introduced. The majority of extension systems
are free to read and manipulate the web page’s Document
Object Model (DOM). In addition, many common privileges
include access to the user’s browsing history, bookmarks
and even lower level functionality such as arbitrary file ac-
cess. The levels of privilege vary depending on the security
model set out by the browser’s implementation. Chrome
utilizes an extension system that heavily makes use of the
isolated worlds paradigm, which in layman’s terms simply
means each script runs within their own sandbox. Firefox
on the other hand, including Firefox for Android, utilizes
an extension model that has been subject to wide criticism,
with Liverani and Freeman claiming security was “almost
inexistent” [11].
2.1 Chrome Extensions
Chrome extensions comprise three distinct components: the
manifest file, the event pages, and content scripts. Addi-
tional pages such as HTML or style sheets may also be
included within the extension provided they are declared
within the manifest. Chrome enforces within its extensions
the principle of least authority (POLA), a motif in the security
community which entails allocating only the permissions
necessary to complete a specific action. A manifest file must
be declared to specify which permissions and URLs the
extension is allowed to access. In theory, this fine granularity
of permissions should deter users from installing extensions
which request permissions outside its intended scope. How-
ever studies have shown that permission systems are not
as effective as predicted [12], [13] as most users tend to
trust applications which seem to come from reputable or
popular sources. Some users are also not aware of potential
security implications which are caused, or simply do not
find taking the risk of installing permissive applications to
be problematic.
Event pages act as the intermediate layer between the
browser and the content scripts. Event pages run as a sepa-
rate process within Google Chrome, and access browser con-
texts via APIs, which bridge the sensitive internal browser
operations to a set of reduced calls that guarantee restriction
in what the extensions themselves have the power to do.
In the situation an event page wants to modify the page’s
content, communication may bilaterally occur between the
event pages and content scripts; it is important to note that
event pages do not have direct access to the DOM.
Content scripts are JavaScript files which are injected
within a web page, and run in the same process space as the
document that is rendered. They have the ability to read and
manipulate the DOM without restrictions, providing the
appropriate permission is adjudicated. Furthermore, content
scripts may arbitrarily issue outbound cross-origin HTTP
requests, without requesting additional permissions. This
exposes a design decision that has some security implica-
tions to it, as we will explain later.
2.2 Firefox Extensions
Jetpack extensions were introduced by Mozilla in 2013 as
a solution to the archaic XPCOM-based extension system
used by early versions of Firefox. XPCOM, stands for cross
platform component object model and provides access to lower
level interfaces. Within XPCOM, the functionalities allowed
include reading system files and utilizing system libraries.
Jetpack was devised as a model which utilized the POLA
within its modules to contain vulnerabilities. Jetpack exten-
sions, in similar regards to Chrome, comprise a manifest file,
at least one module (which mirrors event pages in Chrome)
and content scripts. An interesting note is that the manifest
file in Jetpack extensions specifies metadata rather than
permissions. This is in contrast to Chrome which employs
a detailed permission schema and displays it to the user at
install time.
Modules serve as the interface between native browser
APIs, and any content scripts that have been registered
within the extension. Mozilla provides a set of core modules
which can be re-used with the aim to provide a safer inter-
face to low-level functions. These core modules can be used
indiscriminately by an extension developer. It is expected
that within the Jetpack implementation, a strong isolation
policy between modules and access to the native XPCOM
components should be in place; however, even as of recently,
Add-on SDK still allows developers to access the majority
of the XPCOM functions. Though, like Chrome, modules do
not have access to the DOM of a page, a similar message
passing system allows communication between the module
APIs and a content script. Content scripts in Firefox perform
a role identical to that described in Chrome’s model.
2.2.1 Firefox for Android
Firefox for Android, also known as the Fennec project, was
introduced in 2011. It is essentially a port of the main Firefox
adapted to run on the Android platform. The code pertinent
to our research, within the Add-on SDK, is nearly a one
to one mapping between standard Firefox and its Fennec
counterpart. Due to the differences between the security
policies of the Android operating system compared to a PC
(say Windows) operating system, we do observe differences
in the impacts of some of our attacks. A similar observation
can be made due to the introduction of more sensor devices,
by default, on a standard smartphone. We will discuss in
more detail in Section 5 the impact of attacks in different
operating systems.
3 THREAT MODEL
In our threat model, we assume a malicious extension has
been installed on a target’s system. There are many methods
that an adversary can use to persuade a user to install a ma-
licious browser extension, including disguising malicious
extensions as legitimate browser extensions, using Trojans
to install malicious extensions, and missing plugin attacks
[5]. Another method available to attackers is to purchase a
popular extension from its creator and then add malicious
code to it. This technique has been observed to be used
by adware producers [1]. Once a malicious extension is
installed, we assume it has been granted all the privileges it
needs to run, but it is constrained by the general sandboxing
policies for browser extensions.
This threat model is different from the model commonly
assumed by the browser vendors that browser extensions
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a vetting process. We justify our threat model as follows.
First, we should point out that the vetting process is never
bullet-proof, which is acknowledged by browser vendors.
For example, researchers from Google Chrome published
their experience and lessons from years of fighting malicious
extensions [1]. They reported that by using advanced detec-
tion techniques for the vetting process, the best detection
rate that their system was able to achieve is 96.5%. Second,
we argue that a dedicated study on malicious extensions
should be useful. Many users are not aware that a malicious
extension can cause harm to their security and privacy. On
the other hand, some security researchers might think of
the other extreme: once a malicious extension is installed,
the security is all lost. In fact, malicious extensions are con-
strained by the sandboxing policies of the browser. The exact
threats that a malicious extension can impose on users vary
between the browsers, the underlying extension architec-
tures and operating systems. The main aim in this paper is
to establish a comprehensive and up-to-date understanding
on precisely what malicious extensions can and cannot do
in modern browsers.
The threats we present in our model are the expressed
potential for the concurrence of a harmful event that can
breach confidentiality, integrity and availability. To illustrate
the threats, we implement a wide series of attacks which a
malicious botmaster can launch by abusing the powerful
APIs offered by the extensions. During the experiments, we
also discover several inherent vulnerabilities, which make
some browsers (e.g., Firefox) more susceptible to an attack
than others (e.g., Chrome), which we will detail in Section 5.
4 BOTNET-BASED ATTACK FRAMEWORK
Botnets are prevalent amongst the criminal underworld of
the Internet. They serve as a tool to facilitate attacks against
numerous victims at the same time. Historically, botnets
made use of the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol to dis-
tribute commands to the compromised zombie computers.
However, with IRC falling into gradual disuse, the medium
in which a botnet receives its commands is changing. Some
solutions use simple transport layer protocols such as TCP
or UDP, however, due to its simplicity and ease of access
at the application layer, HTTP has become more popular as
the next transmission medium [14].
4.1 The Framework’s Architecture
We designed an architecture for complete control over a
botnet of extensions, utilizing a simple Command & Control
model (C&C) [15]. We illustrate the effect of our attacks
using this architecture on Chrome, Firefox and Firefox for
Android within our model. We illustrate in Figure 1 a
component diagram representing an overview of our botnet
system. Our framework provides the following functional-
ity:
• An API schema which emphasizes independence
from a target extension system, using inspiration
from REST;
• Extensible command issuing system, along with data
categorization utilities;
Fig. 1: Our botnet-based framework.
Fig. 2: The web panel for the bot master
• An easy to use graphic user interface (see Figure 2);
• Three examples of malicious extensions which ex-
haustively implement malicious capabilities respec-
tive to Chrome, Firefox and Firefox for Android.
4.2 The Framework in Operation
Each extension uses a phone-home beacon periodically to
identify itself to the bot master’s server. In our implementa-
tion we randomly generate and store a unique identifier that
corresponds to one instance of an extension. If the user uses
social media (say Facebook), we further tie the victim’s iden-
tity to their social media account. We note that several other
methods exist in identifying a user, including via IP address
or fingerprinting techniques using metadata available to
the browser. One advantage of our botnet framework is to
allow automated testing on an exhaustive list of capabilities
that a malicious extension may exploit. On receiving an
identity, the botmaster’s server will automatically find a list
of commands associated with the identity and return it to
the extension. The extension will automatically execute said
command, and mark it as executed. Victim data is then sent
to the botmaster, though we note that certain attacks operate
passively. For example, HTML data is periodically sent to
the remote server at a set interval.
4.3 Botnet Structures
We will briefly discuss in this section other common botnet
paradigms, and how feasibly they can be implemented
using extensions.
Rallying Techniques. Rallying refers to the process in
which a C&C server discovers the domain/IP address of the
central command server [15]. Hard-coding the domain name
4is the easiest solution, however obfuscation techniques us-
ing minifiers are a viable alternative when using extensions.
Other masking techniques include using Dynamic DNS
services. Using this method, an attacker can mask the real
C&C address behind a series of DNS servers, in which
the path to the command server can be made resilient to
mitigate against law enforcement shutting a server down.
The use of Domain Generation Algorithms can be deployed
by including the generation algorithm in the source code of
the extension.
Peer-to-Peer Botnets. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) botnets are a
phenomena that developed after the popularization of P2P
networks. Each node acts as both a client, and a server,
distributing commands to each peer it has registered, as
well as executing them. Browser-based P2P botnets are
made possible by a new technology called WebRTC, which
provides APIs for P2P data interchange. WebRTC allows
web browsers to request resources not only from backend
servers, but also directly from browsers of other users. Our
experiments show that P2P botnets could be implemented
using WebRTC on both browsers, which will make it harder
for law enforcements to take down a botnet.
5 THREATS CAUSED BY MALICIOUS EXTENSIONS
Within this section, we systematically categorize, describe
and tabulate threats caused by malicious extensions, with
an analysis against the CIA (confidentiality, integrity, avail-
ability) triad model. To illustrate the threats, we implement
concrete attacks and verify them against Chrome, Firefox
and Firefox for Android browsers on multiple operating
systems including Windows, Linux and Android. Details of
the attacks are presented below. See Table 1 for a summary
of the results.
5.1 DOM Based Capabilities
The DOM has been highlighted in a variety of prior studies
including [6], [7], [8], [16], [17] as a common source for mali-
cious exploitation. Similarly, the near-unrestricted access to
JavaScript functionality has also been discussed at length in
previous studies as well as [2], [18]. Generally, these studies
take the approach of exploiting benign-but-buggy extensions,
rather than assuming the role of an attacker who has gained
control over the extension’s source code.
Full DOM Access. We confirm the prevalent belief
that extensions currently offer minimal protection against
full DOM manipulation. The case is slightly mitigated by
Chrome’s permission systems restricting content scripts to
executing on sites declared within the manifest file. How-
ever, this is impinged on by extension developers setting
broad permissive tags which allow content script execution
on any webpage.
Iframe Based Phishing. Prior works have identified
iframes as troublesome in making indirect cross-site re-
quests [7] and a prominent malvertisting source [19]. How-
ever, we specifically observe their power in launching
phishing attacks against HTTPS sites. Commonly, a user is
instructed to check the URL of a website, as well as the
information of the green lock next to the URL bar to verify
that the integrity of the site has not been compromised and
no intruder is launching a man-in-the-middle attack. Our
iframe attack was able to seamlessly substitute the page
with an attacker’s phishing site, whilst giving the victim
the credence that they were still browsing their original site.
This was done without tampering either the URL bar, or
the information shown within the lock dialog. We motivate
this attack with an example, shown in Figure 3, illustrating
the Facebook page substituted with the phishing page:
Phishbook.
5.2 JavaScript Based Capabilities
JavaScript brings a plethora of functionality that can be
of interest to an attacker. Listeners for keystrokes, mouse-
strokes and touchstrokes were found to be applicable in
attacks against both browsers. Furthermore, attacks against
the availability of the browser via executing resource ex-
hausting scripts were found to be effective, especially on
Firefox, which has no recovery safeguard in place due to its
monolithic process architecture. Furthermore, sensor based
APIs such as HTML5’s geolocation were requested as part of
the website rather than the extension: thus if a user accepts
access to their GPS device, the extension can read their
geolocation coordinates.
Unrestricted Cross-Site Requests. We validate that the
extension models we evaluated do not restrict cross-site re-
quests made via XHR (XML HTTP Requests). XHR requests
are the most powerful tool for a botnet’s arsenal. Remote
connections can be made to an attacker-controlled server
for harvested data to be transmitted back, as well as for
commands to be distributed across the botnet.
5.3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vs. Extensions
XSS can be used to launch the attacks we have described
in the previous sections as they are JavaScript based. An
XSS attacker relies on finding a vulnerability within a site,
where they can launch an XSS payload. An attacker using
an extension can always launch the attack via the content
script.
5.4 Cookie Capabilities
To mitigate the impact of XSS attacks, flags demarcating
the cookie as being inaccessible by JavaScript are used,
known as HTTPOnly flags. We find that extensions have
access to more powerful cookie APIs which allow access
to cookies even if they are marked as HTTPOnly, Session
or Secure. Browsers allow access by extensions to these
extended features as extensions are seen as “trusted” once
installed, whereas regular JavaScript is not. By periodically
transmitting cookie values back to the attacker’s remote
server, session hijacking attacks may be performed with
relative ease.
5.5 Clipboard, Bookmark and History Capabilities
We validate the findings performed in [7] on Firefox, and
apply the analysis on Chrome and Fennec. It was found
that in Fennec, Mozilla have not yet implemented any
Add-On SDK method of accessing the clipboard, bookmark
or history, though a bypass for the clipboard was found
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Capabilities Category
(Botnet Commands)
Chrome
(54)
Firefox
(49)
Firefox
Android
(49)
CIA Triad Impact Comments
DOM-Based Capabilities
Read Web Page’s DOM
[6], [7], [16] 3 3 3 Confidentiality. Full read access to a page’s DOM is possible.
Edit Web Page’s DOM
[6], [7], [16] 3 3 3 Integrity, Availability. Editing existing DOM elements is possible.
Write to Web Page’s
DOM [6], [7], [16]
3 3 3 Integrity, Availability. Appending new content to the DOM is possible.
Replace Web Page’s
DOM [6], [7], [16]
3 3 3 Integrity, Availability. Replacing an element of the DOM with another
is possible.
Iframe Based Phishing 3 3 3 Integrity, Availability. Changing a page’s entire DOM structure to an
external iframe, without modifying the URL, is
possible for both http and https sites.
JavaScript-Based Capabilities
Crash Browser Partial 3 3 Availability. Chrome’s multi-process system mitigates the at-
tack to only the active tab. Firefox is subject to
an entire browser crash.
Use of Eval
[2], [7], [16], [18], [20] Partial Partial Partial Integrity Chrome sandboxes instances of eval, though it
can be disabled by editing the Content-Security
Policy. Firefox’s review process adopts a harsh
extension rejection mechanism for extensions
using eval. Eval can be abused to remotely
execute tailored JavaScript code.
XHR Requests
[6], [7], [16], [18], [21] 3 3 3 Confidentiality. XHR Requests can be used to transmit DOM
content, or supply botnet commands.
Location Data [17] 3 3 3 Confidentiality. The request is made using JavaScript originating
from a site, rather than the extension, so it is
not unreasonable to assume that a user may
click allow allowing for GPS coordinates to be
scraped - if the site has originally requested it,
then the decision is stored and is not requested
again by the extension.
Keystrokes [7] 3 3 3 Confidentiality. Keystrokes can be captured and transmitted
with relative ease.
Mousestrokes / Touch-
strokes [17]
3 3 3 Confidentiality. Mousestrokes or touchstrokes on Android can
impact on a user’s privacy such as capturing
websites which use graphical passwords.
Cookie Capabilities
Read Cookies [7], [16] 3 3 3 Confidentiality. A full listing of cookies can be read, including
HTTP-Only and Secure cookies.
Edit Cookies [7], [16] 3 3 3 Integrity, Availability. Cookies can be edited indiscriminately.
Delete Cookies [7], [16] 3 3 3 Integrity, Availability. Cookies can be deleted indiscriminately.
Clipboard Capabilities
Read Clipboard 3 3 3 Confidentiality. Clipboard data can be read in both Chrome and
Firefox.
Modify Clipboard 3 3 3 Integrity. Clipboard can be modified via the use of
JavaScript in all browsers.
Bookmark Capabilities
Read Bookmarks [7] 3 3 7 Confidentiality. A full listing of user bookmarks can be accessed.
Fennec provides no native method to interact
with bookmarks.
Add Bookmarks [7] 3 3 7 Integrity. Adding bookmarks, including folders, is possi-
ble, except in Fennec.
Edit Boookmarks [7] 3 3 7 Integrity, Availability. Current bookmarks can be traversed and up-
dated, leading to malicious URL changes, except
in Fennec.
Delete Boookmarks [7] 3 3 7 Availability. Chrome imposes restrictions on removing and
adding bookmarks in the root folder, however,
the rest are deletable. Not possible on Fennec.
6Capabilities Category
(Botnet Commands)
Chrome
(54)
Firefox
(49)
Firefox
Android
(49)
CIA Triad Impact Comments
Browsing History Capabilities
Read History [7] 3 3 7 Confidentiality Access to a user’s browsing history is possible,
though not supported yet in Add-on SDK for
Fennec.
Write to History 3 7 7 Integrity. Firefox does not natively support writing entries
to the browser history.
Delete History 3 7 7 Availability. Firefox does not natively support deleting en-
tries from the browser history.
File System Capabilities
Directory Listing
[7], [16], [17] 7 3 3 Confidentiality. Directory listing is available on Firefox; An-
droid’s file system restrictions prevent some
directories from being listed.
Read Files [7], [16], [17] 7 3 3 Confidentiality. Reading files, including system files, is avail-
able, though Android’s default root permissions
apply.
Edit Files [7], [16], [17] 7 3 3 Integrity. If the user permission in which Firefox was
started with matches the file’s access permis-
sions, then editing is possible.
Delete Files
[7], [16], [17] 7 3 3 Availability. If the user permission in which Firefox was
started with matches the file’s access permis-
sions, then deleting content is possible.
Add new Folders
[7], [16], [17] Partial 3 3 Integrity. Permission withstanding, adding folders to the
file system is possible in Firefox. In Chrome,
only subfolders may be added to the already
configured downloads directory.
Add new Files
[7], [16], [17] Partial 3 3 Integrity. Permission withstanding, adding files to the
file system is possible in Firefox. In Chrome,
downloading files programatically is plausible,
but only to the configured downloads folder.
Prompts are displayed on dangerous file down-
loads within Chrome.
Execute Processes
[7], [16], [17] 7 3 Partial Confidentiality,
Integrity, Availability.
Executing files, including terminal commands is
possible in Firefox. Android’s scope is limited to
only executing APK files.
Extension Management Capabilities
Disable Extensions [7] 3 7 7 Availability. Can be done on Chrome silently, functionality
was recently removed from Firefox.
Uninstall Extensions [7] Partial 3 3 Availability. Chrome requires user confirmation, whereas
Firefox can uninstall extensions silently.
Other Capabilities
Proxy Settings 3 3 3 Confidentiality,
Integrity, Availability.
Browser proxy settings can be modified to point
to an attacker-controlled proxy.
Browser Preferences [7] 7 3 3 Integrity. Firefox exposes methods to change internal
browser preferences.
DDoS [6], [17], [21] 3 3 3 Availability. XHR Requests are not rate limited thus ex-
tensions can be used for flooding-based DDoS
attacks. Depends on JavaScript capabilities.
Password Manager [7],
[16], [17]
7 3 3 Confidentiality If a user has not set a master password, plaintext
passwords can be gathered silently. If the user
has set a master password, then it will require
entering it within the prompt.
XPCOM Usage [7], [11],
[17], [22]
7 3 3 Confidentiality,
Integrity, Availability.
Can still be used in Jetpack extensions, though
Firefox will be deprecating XPCOM soon.
System Library / API
Usage [7], [11], [17], [22]
7 3 3 Confidentiality,
Integrity, Availability.
Low-level APIs such as WinAPI, Linux OS li-
braries, and the JNI on Android can be bridged
and accessed by Firefox extensions.
Battery Drain [17] 7 7 3 Availability. It can be made so that a phone will not automat-
ically go to sleep when left unattended.
Certificate Exceptions 7 3 3 Confidentiality,
Integrity.
An attack we introduce, and describe within
the article. Has a dependency on file system
capabilities.
7on the Android system utilising XPCOM functions. On
Chrome and Firefox, it was found that full access to a user’s
browsing history was possible. Modifying or deleting items
from the history was a privilege granted only to Chrome,
though it is possible to use file capabilities to emulate this
attack on Firefox by modifying the places.sqlite file directly.
Bookmarks were found to be creatable, readable, updatable
and deletable on both desktop browsers. The clipboard was
found to be accessible and modifiable on all browsers. All
three functions discussed in this section can be used to
invade a target’s privacy, as well as inject content such as
illicit material into the target’s browser.
5.6 Firefox Exclusive Attacks
From the literature analyzed in combination with our own
analysis of Firefox and Fennec, we observe that its less
restrictive permission model allows us to access the exter-
nal environment of the operating system itself, as Firefox
provides access to it via a series of APIs. The original devel-
opment philosophy of Mozilla extensions was to make their
extensions as powerful as the browser itself, and though
over a decade of security analysis has been performed on
the Firefox system which resulted in more restrictions being
applied, we present some critical observations we have
made within this section.
5.6.1 File System Capabilities.
Firefox’s arbitrary file system access has been a longstanding
concern amongst the extension community. We confirm that
Firefox still allows extensions to access the file system,
resulting in the possibility of arbitrary file reading, writing
or deleting. Modifying folders and manipulating existing
files and directory data was also confirmed as possible, as
well as executing files and commands. As there exists no
data transmission barriers between reading a file, and an
XHR request, an attacker can read the contents of a file and
transmit them back using the botnet framework we have
introduced. Another scenario an attacker could launch using
our framework involves writing a file to a directory, then
launching a command to execute the said file.
It is important to note that these capabilities operate on
the premise of privilege inheritance. Hence, if the browser
is started by a user that does not have access to writing to
a certain directory, then the operation is refused. Firefox for
Android is most strongly affected by this situation, as the
Android operating system restricts a large portion of the
file system from being read, written or executed for phones
which are not rooted. A similar case can be argued for
desktop operating systems, however, traditional operating
systems like Windows allow less restrictions with executing
and reading files, by default.
5.6.2 XPCOM and System Library Usage.
XPCOM is a powerful native interface used within Firefox
to provide endpoints for use by extensions, which allows
access to native browser methods that are used in the
browser’s programming interface. These features remain
exposed within Add-on SDK. We also make the observation
that operating system libraries such as the WinAPI on Win-
dows, or the JNI glue library on Android can be accessed
Fig. 3: The result of an extension substituting Facebook’s
page with “Phishbook” in an iframe based phishing attack.
The browser continues to identify the page as Facebook
(note the genuine https:/ /www.facebook.com in the URL).
with little restriction. This can result in an extension calling
low level routines exposed in the operating system user
space, such as accessing process memory.
5.6.3 A Note on Firefox for Android
Fennec’s Add-on SDK port was generally designed to be
backwards compatible with desktop Firefox. We thus ob-
served a vast similarity in the range of attacks that could be
performed on Android users who use Firefox. There exists
one main study done on the security of Firefox for Android
conducted by Marston et al. [17] in 2014. The researchers
identified certain malicious capabilities within the Add-On
system, as well as some predicted vulnerabilities in the
future. We confirmed Marston et al.’s section of the study
which focused on malicious extensions, and found that their
results could be repeated. We also found that their predicted
vulnerabilities, based on our experiments, remain currently
not possible.
After applying Marston et al.’s study to our botnet
framework, we applied the analysis we performed on
Chrome and Firefox, to Fennec, and programmed the ma-
licious functionality within a sample extension. We found,
apart from the differences we have highlighted in Table 1
and the prior sections, that attacks using sensors were
more plausible as mobile phones are far more likely to
contain devices such as GPS in their hardware than a desk-
top computer. Furthermore, we also conducted an attack
against battery drainage, by preventing the phone from
auto-locking, which shows that performing denial of service
attacks against power resources is also possible.
5.7 Certificate Exception Attack
One benefit of a systematic categorization of capabilities is
that it enables us to discover how seemingly innocuous APIs
can interact with the underlying system in an unexpected
way to compromise the user’s security. As a demonstration
of this, we present a certification exception attack that has
not been reported before.
The security of our online transactions critically depends
on the HTTPS protocol and on the management of the public
8key certificates. A public key certificate is issued by a trusted
certificate authority (CA) and cryptographically binds the
site’s identity with other details such as an expiry date in
a digital signature. Within Firefox, including Fennec, it is
possible for a user to manually specify a certificate exception
via the user interface provided, if a site uses an untrusted or
erroneous certificate.
Our proposed attack removes this element of interaction
from the victim, and allows certificate exceptions to be
added silently without the victim being privy to this knowl-
edge. This is because Firefox insecurely stores certificate
exceptions in a plain-text file located in the user profile in
a file named cert override.txt. An attacker can manipulate
this file so that new certificate exceptions could be added.
This attack was reproducible on Firefox for Android. We
emphasize that this vulnerability does not exist in Chrome
where certificate exceptions are stored on a per session basis.
As with our previous attacks, we integrated this attack
so that it was possible to specify a site and certificate
to add, remotely, via the botnet framework. It was found
that expired and untrusted (such as self-signed) certificates,
along with certificates containing URL mismatches could be
silently marked as trusted using this attack.
This attack has several implications. Ordinary web users
are often educated to check the padlock as a security sign
of a web site. The browser must warn the user if there
is any abnormality in the certificate. However, our attack
shows that the presence of a padlock has little meaning
when the exception warnings can be silently suppressed
by an extension. Furthermore, if a certificate exception is
added without the user’s knowledge, then the attack can
be leveraged to perform man-in-the-middle attacks [23].
Other implications include marking outdated certificates as
valid, as well as allowing sub-domain mismatches within
certificates to occur, which can be a problem in shared
domains.
5.8 Extension Management Capabilities
First analyzed by Wang et al. [7] on Firefox, browsers
provide extension mechanisms to manipulate and access
data regarding other extensions present on the browser.
Capabilities that allow an extension to disable or unin-
stall are the most pertinent to an attacker, as this could
lead to the removal of anti-malware extensions from the
victim’s computer. It was found through our experiments
that Chrome did not allow silent uninstallation of other
extensions, opting to show a dialog of confirmation instead.
However, it did allow for extensions to be disabled silently
without notifying the victim. On Firefox, a reverse of this
situation was observed. Disabling an extension was no
longer possible; however, uninstalling extensions was found
to be achievable. This situation applied to Fennec as well.
5.9 Other Capabilities
As we highlight in Table 1, a variety of other problematic
APIs which a malicious attacker may abuse are identified.
The proxy system was found to be editable for protocols
such as HTTP and HTTPS on all three browsers examined.
This means that traffic could be routed to an attacker-
controlled server and examined. Attacks against the avail-
ability of a user’s Internet are also possible as an attacker
can change the proxy address to an inexistent IP address,
causing connections to fail.
Firefox, including Fennec, exposes an API to the pass-
word manager system. These features were identified by
Wang et al. [7], and we verify them as still currently func-
tional. By default, the password manager does not encrypt
the password store with a master password until the user
sets one up; this results in unrestricted access to passwords
stored in the manager. If a user has set up a password
manager, then the attack is still effective, as long as the
victim enters the password within the prompt offered by
Firefox and the extension will subsequently gain access to
all the stored passwords.
5.10 Bypassing the Web Stores
We managed to upload a customized extension to Chrome’s
web store using the update system. The extension has the
iframe-based phishing attack, which reads the command
from our web server. We uploaded a similar extension to
Mozilla’s add-on store, based on the certificate exception
attack. This extension also was designed so it could read
commands from our web server. During the review in
the vetting process, we disconnected the server so that no
one would be affected by our (proof-of-concept) attacks.
We removed both extensions as soon as they passed the
vetting process before anyone else was able to download
them, following the guideline from our university ethics
committee.
To bypass the vetting process, we masked the mali-
cious extension as a benign extension via the use of clean,
structured and well commented code that indicated the
extension served a valid research purpose. Although in the
comments, we documented that the extension was written
for a research project, we wanted to test if the extension
could pass the automated checks by Chrome and Firefox.
The vetting process by Chrome is primarily automated, and
the extension we submitted there was quickly approved.
Firefox has an additional stage of manual review, which
took longer. But in the end, the extension was also approved.
We disclosed our findings to Google and Mozilla. Google
replied by highlighting their web store policy regarding
that they remove malicious extensions. However, our ex-
periments indicated that uploading a malicious extension
controlled by the botnet was possible. As of the time of
writing, Mozilla has yet to reply.
6 COMPARISON WITH MALWARE
Malware is a term that aggregates and identifies programs
which exhibit malicious behaviors towards their victims.
As compared with traditional malware, an extension-based
botnet has the advantage that administrator privileges are
not required for installing the extension. Furthermore, once
installed, extensions effectively form an integral part of the
browser and hence can easily avoid detection by anti-virus
software. In this section, we will compare our extension-
based botnet with other malware according to the taxonomy
of malware behaviors presented by Gregio et al. [24].
9Viruses, Worms and Trojans. Viruses can be produced
via extensions, though are more effective on Firefox due to
its capability to write and execute files. Traditional worms
face some restrictions in propagating via extensions. A
classical worm will self-propagate, typically via a known
exploit that requires little to no user interaction to spread
the worm. To successfully launch a browser worm, exploits
would need to be found within the browser’s core logic.
With this in mind, an adversary may still distribute worms
via Firefox’s extension system, due to its control of low level
APIs. To give a contemporary example, the ransomware
WannaCry exploited a Windows flaw [25], and then spread
itself automatically using worm-like behavior by abusing
the flaw in unpatched systems. With Firefox’s capabilities
to make low-level API calls, it’s not too hard to envision
the possibility of loading worms like WannaCry into an
extension. However, this method would not be currently
possible on Chrome. Finally, trojans can be created with
relative ease and such was the case documented by Utakrit
[26] in his analysis of extension-based banking trojans.
Botnets and DDoS. We refer the reader to Section 4 for
a detailed analysis of botnets, and different architectures.
Botnets are often used to launch Distributed Denial of
Service (DDos) attacks. To assess the feasibility, we have
implement a DDoS attack based on the use of XHR as
in [21] for both extension systems. We observed that an
average of 252 XHR requests could be sent per second, from
one machine. With some established botnets having reached
over 180,000 [27], this number could be amplified to a max-
imum 45,360,000 requests per second. With such a number
of requests, flooding-based DDoS becomes a possible attack
that can be performed by extension botnets.
Spyware, Adware & Ransomware. Table 1 documented
a large portion of features that can be used to break the
user’s confidentiality. For example, with liberal access to the
DOM possible, Spyware can be written to simply transmit
the user’s browsing contents to the central command server
on all three targeted browsers. Cookies, browsing history,
bookmarks, keystrokes from within the browser focus, loca-
tion data and passwords can all be captured by extension-
based Spyware. Adware can be further introduced by break-
ing the integrity of the browser or DOM; within our im-
plementation we provide a Spam attack, that enables the
injection of an attacker-defined HTML ad into the browser’s
current page. Ransomware cannot be effectively created in
Chrome extensions, as it could only encrypt the contents of
a webpage. Within Firefox, ransomware could be created to
encrypt some of the file system’s contents leaving the victim
unable to access their documents without paying a ransom
for the decryption key.
Rootkits. Rootkits by their traditional definition give the
attacker a way of acquiring root or system-level permissions
as a result of an exploit. This type of malware would be
unlikely to deploy using extensions, especially in Chrome
due to its isolated worlds model and Fennec as Android
typically blocks root access by default. Such an attack would
require a major vulnerability within the browser. Another
possibility is that a Firefox extension can download and
write a rootkit to the file system and execute it. However
it would still require the user to confirm the escalation of
privileges dialog, which can raise the alert.
Surreptitious Software. Code can be obfuscated in ex-
tensions by using a JavaScript minifier, or remotely loading
the extension code from an attacker-controlled source. The
use of obfuscation is commonly used to bypass Chrome’s
extension review process, whereas Firefox’s review process
can be bypassed by writing code that appears benign and
utilizes social engineering to mislead the reviewers of its
benignity. In the extension we uploaded to the Firefox add-
on store, we heavily made use of comments describing to
the reviewers that the extension was for internal use within
our university only.
7 COUNTERMEASURES
Having presented a thorough overview of the threats
present in modern extensions, we now take a step back
and discuss a range of countermeasures. Some of the
threats/vulnerabilities identified in this paper can be easily
addressed, but for many others, fundamental changes in
the underlying extension architecture are needed, which
requires further research.
Restricting Arbitrary Access to the DOM. An extension
of the privilege management system on Chrome, was pro-
posed by Liu et al.’s paper [6]. They introduce the concept of
sensitivity as a default protection mechanism against DOM
elements which typically contain confidential information,
such as password inputs. Sensitivity levels are by default
applied to HTML elements according to a default mapping
between levels and elements. For example, high sensitivity
may be applied to input tags containing the password
attribute, whereas medium sensitivity is applied to tags
containing IDs or usernames. By default, other elements
are marked as having a low sensitivity. Content scripts are
marked with a default sensitivity level. This level corre-
sponds to the elements from which they may read a value.
If a content script has lower privileges than the sensitivity of
the element it is attempting to read, the read will be rejected.
Iframe Based Phishing. Using an extension to substitute
or modify a page with an iframe that loads external content,
especially on an HTTPS site, should be detected. This would
add negligible overhead, as it would only require checking
if an iframe is being inserted by a content script. For further
usability, a user may be presented a confirmation dialog
clearly illustrating the domain where the external content
is loaded from which they may then chose to allow or
disallow. As this would only apply to iframes inserted by
extensions, this would not affect advertising or legitimate
web-uses of iframes.
Defeating the Botnet: Restricting Cross-Site Requests.
Cross-site requests are a dangerous tool as they allow sen-
sitive information to be transmitted to a remote location.
Proposals to curb the damage done by cross-site requests
have been introduced by several studies. Liu et al.’s [6]
aforementioned paper introduced a micro-privilege manage-
ment schema which separates cross-site access between the
extension core and the content scripts. The extension core is
granted explicit cross-site access privileges via the manifest
file, whereas any attempt to bypass this via the use of a
malicious content script is prevented by having it explicitly
declare any remote origins added to the web page. This
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schema informs the user which sites the extension has access
to in transmitting information.
Over-Permissive Browser APIs. The main countermea-
sure in effect against the arbitrary use of JavaScript APIs
is permission management. This method is only in use
within Chrome, as it is necessary to explicitly declare the
APIs which the extension uses, in the manifest file. Permis-
sion systems however are not a silver bullet to preventing
the malicious use of APIs. Application permission systems
experience multiple shortcomings, with adware develop-
ers using enticement techniques and look-alike naming
schemes to push more invasive permissions out to users
[12]. Furthermore, additional evidence exists that permis-
sions become less effective over an installed application’s
lifetime.
We recommend some minor changes to Chrome’s per-
mission system by marking more dangerous permissions
with greater prominence on the installation prompt, rather
than presenting them equally as if they have analogous
security implications. This is an idea introduced by Felt
et al [13]. Ideally, no read data from browser APIs should
be transmitted via a cross-site request, but enforcing this
would not be practical by current technology. We therefore
take a moderate stance in suggesting a combination of the
countermeasures suggested in managing cross-site requests,
alongside a well designed permission system. We suggest
in particular that Mozilla should follow this schema within
WebExtensions.
Firefox and Fennec’s Privileged Extension Model. Cur-
rently, Mozilla are attempting to phase in WebExtensions,
a modernization of the previous extension systems. From
recent analysis, it appears Mozilla has removed APIs that
allowed access to the file system and other contexts out-
side the browser. However, their success will rely on the
extension developers to migrate to using the proposed We-
bExtensions kit. There are no dates currently on whether
Jetpack will be fully removed or operate in parallel to
WebExtensions.
Firefox’s Certificate Exception Attack. Certificate ex-
ceptions should not be added by extensions, nor stored in
plaintext. The cert override.txt file poses a suitable target for
malware running with non-superuser privileges. We recom-
mend that the method of providing certificate exceptions
should follow a system similar to that of Chrome, where
certificate exceptions are always approved by the user, on
the per session basis.
8 RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the related work. Although the
threats of malicious extensions have been reported before,
we are not aware of any systematization of knowledge
about effects of malicious extensions against major browsers
across multiple operating systems. Our paper contributes to
this subject by systematically analyzing existing literature,
as well as running experiments enumerating an exhaustive
range of APIs that can be abused for malicious purposes.
Malicious Browser Extensions. Prior work was con-
ducted in this area on the Google Chrome browser by
Liu et al. [6] who demonstrated the power that could be
exploited from Chrome extensions as part of a rudimentary
botnet. An empirical study of dangerous behaviours on
Firefox extensions was performed by Wang et al. [7], in
which a set of 2465 web store extensions were examined
against an array of security-critical functionality of varying
threat levels. Ter Louw et al. detail a comprehensive browser
extension study in 2008 [22], though it largely focuses on the
XPCOM architecture. We also note the works done by Acker
et al. [28], who identify malicious and vulnerable scripts
within the popular Firefox community scripting extension,
Greasemonkey.
Exploiting Benign Extensions. Works were done by
Barth et al. [16] in designing the extension model, that has
been adopted by Chrome. Their paper proposes an adapted
version of their research to Firefox. Carlini et al. [18] eval-
uated the Chrome extension architecture for features which
would bypass or compromise the principles proposed by
Barth et al. Following that analysis, they produced an eval-
uation of 100 randomly selected Chrome extensions to audit
them for hidden vulnerabilities, and discovered at least 40%
had at least one vulnerability which could be exploited.
Extension Vulnerabilities. Generally, vulnerability ex-
ploitation is reported via Chrome and Firefox’s respective
vulnerability programs. Publishing an article about the vul-
nerability is left at the discretion of the reporter. However,
there is adequate academic research targeted towards ex-
ploiting vulnerabilities within extensions themselves. Liv-
erani and Freeman [11] further demonstrate XSS attacks
against Firefox’s chrome privilege zone.
Static and Dynamic Analysis Techniques. Static analy-
sis techniques were introduced by Bandhakavi et al. [20],
creating the vetting tool VEX. The tool identifies poten-
tially malicious flows in Firefox extensions by analysing
the source code. Dynamic analysis tools were introduced by
studies such as those conducted by Dhawan and Ganapathy
[10] and Kapravelos et al. [2]. These tools are inbuilt into the
browser and involve tagging and monitoring objects which
have an untrusted source as its provenance. Both of these
analysis techniques can be used to diminish attempts to per-
form malicious actions successfully, though it is unknown
how serious the impact of code obfuscation is.
9 CONCLUSION
We have introduced a browser extension based botnet
framework, which we implemented as a way of demonstrat-
ing the impact of running botnets in Chrome, Firefox and
Firefox for Android Jetpack extensions. We enumerate the
list of malicious capabilities of these extensions, and discuss
countermeasures to the identified security problems.
ETHICS AND CODE AVAILABILITY
All of our experiments were approved by the university
ethics committee. The proof-of-concept attacks were per-
formed on the authors’ own computers and used freshly
created facebook accounts only for the testing purpose. For
obvious reasons, we cannot release the developed exten-
sions as open-source code, but we intend to make the code
available, upon request, to researchers working in this field.
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